The Whiteness of AI by Cave, Stephen & Dihal, Kanta
1 
 
The Whiteness of AI 
 
Stephen Cave 
Leverhulme Centre for the  
Future of Intelligence 
University of Cambridge 
sjc53@cam.ac.uk 
Kanta Dihal 
Leverhulme Centre for the  
Future of Intelligence 
University of Cambridge 
ksd38@cam.ac.uk 
 
Overall, I construe race, racialization, and racial identities as on-going sets of politi-
cal relations that require, through constant perpetuation via institutions, discourses, 
practices, desires, infrastructures, languages, technologies, sciences, economies, 
dreams, and cultural artefacts, the barring of nonwhite subjects from the category of 
the human as it is performed in the modern west. 
Alexander G. Weheliye, Habeas Viscus (Weheliye 2014, 2) 
Technology as an abstract concept functions as a white mythology. 
Joel Dinerstein (Dinerstein 2006, 570) 
 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on the fact that AI is predominantly portrayed as white -- in colour, eth-
nicity, or both. We first illustrate the prevalent Whiteness of real and imagined intelligent ma-
chines in four categories: humanoid robots, chatbots and virtual assistants, stock images of 
AI, and portrayals of AI in film and television. We then offer three interpretations of the 
Whiteness of AI, drawing on critical race theory, particularly the idea of the white racial 
frame. First, we examine the extent to which this Whiteness might simply reflect the predom-
inantly White milieus from which these artefacts arise. Second, we argue that to imagine ma-
chines that are intelligent, professional or powerful is to imagine White machines because the 
white racial frame ascribes these attributes predominantly to White people. Third, we argue 
that AI racialised as White allows for a full erasure of people of colour from the White uto-
pian imaginary. Finally, we examine potential consequences of the racialisation of AI, argu-
ing it could exacerbate bias and misdirect concern. 
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1. Introduction 
It is a truth little acknowledged that a machine in possession of intelligence must be white. 
Typing terms like ‘robot’ or ‘artificial intelligence’ into a search engine will yield a prepon-
derance of stock images of white plastic humanoids. Perhaps more notable still, these ma-
chines are not only white in colour, but the more human they are made to look, the more their 
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features are made ethnically White.1 In this paper, we problematize the often unnoticed and 
unremarked-upon fact that intelligent machines are predominantly conceived and portrayed 
as White. We argue that this Whiteness both illuminates particularities of what (Anglophone 
Western) society hopes for and fears from these machines, and situates these affects within 
long-standing ideological structures that relate race and technology. 
Race and technology are two of the most powerful and important categories for understand-
ing the world as it has developed since at least the early modern period. Yet, as a number of 
scholars have noted, their profound entanglement remains understudied (Sinclair 2004; de la 
Peña 2010). There are a number of possible reasons for this -- and, as Bruce Sinclair writes, 
“racial prejudice dominates all of them” (Sinclair 2004, 1). They include the lack of first- or 
secondhand accounts of the role of people of colour in the development and use of technol-
ogy; persistent stereotypes about technology as the province and product of one particular ra-
cial group -- White people; and the persistent tendency of members of that group, who domi-
nate the academy in the US and Europe, to refuse to see themselves as racialised or race as a 
matter of concern at all.  
This lack of scholarly attention is surprising because, as Michael Adas elucidated in 1989, the 
idea of technological superiority was essential to the logic of colonialism. Not only was supe-
rior weaponry and transportation (etc.) necessary for large-scale conquest and control of for-
eign territory, it was also part of its justification: proof that White Europeans were an ad-
vanced civilisation with a right to rule over others (Adas 1989). Fortunately, this lack of atten-
tion is increasingly being remedied, and the relationship between race and technology is be-
ginning to garner the kind of attention that has since the 1970s been given to gender and tech-
nology, following the pioneering work of Donna Haraway, Sandra Harding, and Evelyn Fox 
Keller (Haraway 1991; Harding 1986; Keller 1985). This includes attention to this century’s 
ubiquitous digital technologies. In 2006, Lisa Nakamura asked, “How do we make cybercul-
ture studies a field that as a matter of course employs critical race theory and theories of cul-
tural difference…?” (Nakamura 2006, 35). Since then, a number of significant works have at-
tempted to do just that, including Safiya Noble’s Algorithms of Oppression and Ruha Benja-
min’s Race After Technology (Noble 2018; Benjamin 2019). 
This paper aims to contribute to this body of literature on race and technology by examining 
how the ideology of race shapes conceptions and portrayals of artificial intelligence (AI). Our 
approach is grounded in the philosophy of race and critical race theory, particularly the Black 
feminist theories of bell hooks, Sylvia Wynter and Alexander G. Weheliye (hooks [1992] 1997; 
Wynter 2003; Weheliye 2014), and work in Whiteness studies, including that of Richard Dyer, 
Joe R. Feagin and Ruth Frankenberg (Dyer 1997; Feagin 2013; Frankenberg 1997a). In 2006, 
Feagin coined the term ‘white racial frame’ to describe those aspects of the Anglophone 
Western worldview that perpetuate a racialised hierarchy of power and privilege (Feagin 
2006). In his words, “the white racial frame includes a broad and persisting set of racial stere-
otypes, prejudices, ideologies, interlinked interpretations and narratives, and visual images” 
(Feagin 2013, xi). Although it reached its peak in the age of colonial expansion, this framing 
persists: “Today, as whites move through their lives, they frequently combine racial stereo-
types and biases (a beliefs aspect), racial metaphors and concepts (a deeper cognitive aspect), 
 
1 Following the increasingly common usage of the capitalised form ‘Black’ to denote the ethnicity and ‘black’ 
the colour, we use ‘White’ to refer to the ethnicity and ‘white’ the colour. While not yet the norm, as can be seen 
in our quotations of critics who do not employ this distinction, this usage will make our discussion clearer.  
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racialised images (the visual aspect), racialised emotions (feelings), interpretive racial narra-
tives, and inclinations to discriminate within a broad racial framing” (Feagin 2013, 91). In es-
sence, this paper examines how representations of AI reflect this white racial frame.  
One of the main aims of critical race theory in general, and Whiteness studies in particular, is 
to draw attention to the operation of Whiteness in Western culture. The power of Whiteness’s 
signs and symbols lies to a large extent in their going unnoticed and unquestioned, concealed 
by the myth of colour-blindness. As scholars such as Jessie Daniels and Safiya Noble have 
noted, this myth of colour-blindness is particularly prevalent in Silicon Valley and surround-
ing tech culture, where it serves to inhibit serious interrogation of racial framing (Daniels 
2013; 2015; Noble 2018). Hence the first step for such an interrogation is, in Richard Dyer’s 
term, to ‘make strange’ this Whiteness, de-normalising and drawing attention to it (Dyer 
1997, 10). As Steve Garner puts it, the reason “for deploying whiteness as a lens is that it 
strips a normative privileged identity of its cloak of invisibility” (Garner 2007, 5). This is our 
primary intention in examining intelligent machines through the white racial frame. 
In the next section of this paper, we first lay out current evidence for the assertion that con-
ceptions and portrayals of AI -- both embodied as robots and disembodied -- are racialised, 
then evidence that such machines are predominantly racialised as White. In the third section 
of the paper we offer our readings of this Whiteness. Our methods are qualitative. As de la 
Peña writes: “Studying whiteness means working with evidence more interpretive than tangi-
ble; it requires imaginative analyses of language and satisfaction with identifying possible 
motivations of subjects, rather than definitive trajectories of innovation, production, and con-
sumption” (de la Peña 2010, 926). We offer three interpretations of the Whiteness of AI. First, 
the normalisation of Whiteness in the Anglophone West can go some way to explaining why 
that sphere’s products, including representations of AI, are White. But we argue that this ar-
gument alone is insufficient. Second, we argue that to imagine an intelligent (autonomous, 
agential, powerful) machine is to imagine a White machine because the white racial frame as-
cribes these attributes predominantly to White people. Thirdly, we argue that AI racialised as 
White allows for a full erasure of people of colour from the White utopian imaginary. Such 
machines are conceived as tools that will replace “dirty, dull, or dangerous” tasks (Murphy 
2000, 16), including replacing human interactions that are considered metaphorically dirty: 
White robot servants will allow the White master to live a life of ease unsullied by interaction 
with people of other races. 
2. Seeing the Whiteness of AI 
Our concern in this paper is with the racialisation (as White) of both real and imagined ma-
chines that are implied or claimed to be intelligent. By racialisation, we mean the ascription 
of characteristics that are used to identify and delineate races in a given racial frame, which in 
this case is the Anglophone West. Feagan notes: 
Among the most important ingredients of this frame are: (1) the recurring use of cer-
tain physical characteristics, such as skin colour and facial features, to differentiate 
social groups; (2) the constant linking of physical characteristics to cultural character-
istics; and (3) the regular use of physical and linked cultural distinctions to differenti-
ate socially “superior” and “inferior” groups in a social hierarchy (Feagin 2013, 41).  
It is worth noting that “physical characteristics” need not only refer to those that are visible: 
voice and accent are also used as markers for social categorisation. Similarly, the category 
“cultural characteristics” is also used expansively, and can include markers such as dialect, 
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mannerisms and dress codes, plus also mental and moral qualities, such as diligence, industri-
ousness, reliability, trustworthiness, inventiveness and intellectual ability. Indeed, these men-
tal and moral qualities have always been an essential part of the racial frame, as it is largely 
on the basis of these that claims of superiority or inferiority have been made. 
2.1  Machines Can be Racialised 
That machines can be racialised, in the sense that they can be given attributes that enable 
their identification with human racial categories, has been empirically demonstrated. For ex-
ample, in one study, Christoph Bartneck and colleagues took pictures of the humanoid ‘Nao’ 
robot and adjusted the colouration to match the skin tone of stock images of White and Black 
people (Bartneck et al. 2018). They then asked participants to define the race of the robot with 
several options including “does not apply”. A minority -- ranging across the experiments 
from 7% to 20% -- chose the ‘does not apply’ option, while a majority -- ranging from 53% 
to 70% -- identified the robots as belonging to the race from which their colouration derived. 
They concluded “Participants were able to easily and confidently identify the race of robots 
according to their racialization [...] Thus, there is also a clear sense in which these robots – 
and by extension other humanoid robots – do have race” (Bartneck et al. 2018, 201).  
This should not be surprising. Many machines are anthropomorphised -- that is, made to be 
human-like to some degree -- in order to facilitate human-machine interaction. This might in-
volve obvious physical features (a head on top, two eyes, a mouth, four limbs, bipedalism, 
etc), but it can also include invisible features such as a human-like voice, or human-like inter-
actions, such as politeness or humour. Given the prevalence of racial framing, in most con-
texts to be human-like means to have race. Consequently, as Liao and He point out in their 
discussion of the racialisation of psychotherapeutic chatbots, “racial identity is an integral 
part of anthropomorphized agents” (Liao and He 2020, 2). They go on to explore a number of 
racial cues for virtual agents, including visual cues such as skin colour, but also cultural sig-
nifiers such as names (eg, for male names, Jake as White, Darnell as Black and Antonio as 
Hispanic). Similarly, “even text-based conversational exchanges” -- that is, those with no vis-
ual component at all -- “perform a racial or ethnic identity” through the interlocutors’ choice 
of dialect, etc (Marino 2014, 3).  
Given the sociopolitical importance of the racial frame in structuring people’s interactions, if 
machines are really being racialised, then we would expect this to have an impact on how 
people interact with these machines. Numerous studies show just this. For example, Liao and 
He found that a person’s “perceived interpersonal closeness” with a virtual agent is higher 
when the virtual agent has the same racial identity as that person (Liao and He 2020, 2). Other 
studies reflect the extent to which racism -- prejudicial treatment on the basis of race -- is in-
trinsic to racial framing. 
As detailed in their paper ‘Robots Racialized in the Likeness of Marginalized Social Identi-
ties are Subject to Greater Dehumanization than Those Racialized as White’, Strait et al. ana-
lysed free-form online responses to three videos, each depicting a female-gendered android 
with a different racial identity: Black, White, and East Asian. Their aim was to assess 
whether the same kind of marginalising and dehumanising commentary that is applied to real 
people of colour would be applied to these robots. They found that the valence of the com-
mentary was significantly more negative towards the Black robot than the White or Asian 
ones, and that both the Asian and Black robots were subject to over twice as many dehuman-
ising comments as the White robot (Strait et al. 2018).  
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Two recent studies have further examined the transfer of bias to machines using the ‘shooter 
bias’ paradigm. This paradigm was first described in the 2002 paper ‘The Police Officer’s Di-
lemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals’ (Correll et al. 
2002). It used a simple video game featuring images of (real) Black and White male targets, 
each holding either a gun or a nonthreatening object. Participants were instructed to shoot 
only armed targets. A clear racial bias was identified: “participants fired on an armed target 
more quickly when he was African American than when he was White, and decided not to 
shoot an unarmed target more quickly when he was White than when he was African Ameri-
can” (Correll et al. 2002, 1325). Studies by Bartneck et al., and Addison et al. used the same 
methodology to examine whether this ‘shooter bias’ would be transferred to racialised robots 
(Bartneck et al. 2018; Addison, Bartneck, and Yogeeswaran 2019). They found that “people 
showed a similar shooter bias toward robots racialized as Black relative to White in a similar 
fashion as they showed toward Black vs. White humans, no matter their own race” (Addison, 
Bartneck, and Yogeeswaran 2019, 493). 
2.2 Whiteness as the Norm for Intelligent Machines 
The previous section shows that research has empirically demonstrated that machines can be 
racialised, and that this racialisation includes transfer of the attendant biases found in the hu-
man world. In this subsection, we will survey evidence for the extent to which AI systems -- 
machines purported to be intelligent -- are predominantly racialised as White. We will look 
briefly at four categories: real humanoid robots, virtual personal assistants, stock images of 
AI, and portrayals of AI in film and television.   
2.2.1  The Whiteness of Humanoid Robots 
A number of commentators have remarked on the preponderant Whiteness of humanoid ro-
bots. In their proposed ‘code of ethics’ for human-robot interaction Riek and Howard note the 
“lack of diversity in robot morphology and behavior”:  
In terms of race, with precious few exceptions, such as Hanson’s Bina48, the vast ma-
jority of android and gynoid robots are Asian or Caucasian in their features for no dis-
cernible reason. Furthermore, most of these robots tend to have a euro-centric design 
with regards to their appearance, behavior, and voice. (Riek and Howard 2014, 4) 
Human-computer interaction researchers Christoph Bartneck and colleagues, who conducted 
some of the studies cited above, have also noted that robots are usually racialised as White: 
“most of the main research platforms for social robotics, including Nao, Pepper, and PR2, are 
stylized with white materials and are presumably White” (Bartneck et al. 2018, 202). Finally, 
media studies and literary scholar Jennifer Rhee notes the “normalization and universaliza-
tion of whiteness” as expressed both in earlier robotics research and in robot toys: “Kismet, 
with its blue eyes, light brown eyebrows, and pink ears, also ‘normalizes whiteness’, as do 
other robot companions, such as the blonde-haired, blue-eyed Cindy Smart Doll and the simi-
larly blonde-haired, blue-eyed My Friend Cayla.” (Rhee 2018, 105).  
Although robots such as Nao and Pepper have enjoyed commercial success, neither have re-
ceived quite the attention garnered by Sophia from Hanson Robotics. This machine consists 
foremost of a White humanoid head, sometimes also with an upper torso (see Figure 1). It has 
not only given numerous high-profile television interviews, but received political honours, 
including in 2017 receiving citizenship of Saudi Arabia and becoming an ‘Innovation Cham-
pion’ for the United Nations Development Programme (Weller 2017; UNDP 2017).  
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Fig. 1. Sophia. Hanson Robotics, April 2020. 
 
2.2.2  The Whiteness of Chatbots and Virtual Assistants  
Though conversational agents do not exhibit any visual racial cues, they are racialised by 
means of sociolinguistic markers (Sweeney 2016; Villa-Nicholas and Sweeney 2019). Discussing 
ELIZA, an influential natural language processing program created by Joseph Weizenbaum at 
the MIT AI Laboratory in 1966, Mark Marino writes: “If ELIZA presented a bot that tried to 
imitate language, it was performing standard white middle-class English, without a specific 
identifying cultural inflection... language without culture, disembodied, hegemonic, and, in a 
word, white” (Marino 2014, 5). Since then, natural language processing has entered the main-
stream, with ‘virtual assistants’ existing in many people’s pockets, handbags or homes 
through devices such as smartphones. Indeed, this is one of the most common ways in which 
people interact with technology that could be labelled ‘AI’. These tools present their design-
ers with many decisions about socio-cultural positioning. Ruha Benjamin recalls this anec-
dote: 
A former Apple employee who noted that he was “not Black or Hispanic” described 
his experience on a team that was developing speech recognition for Siri, the virtual 
assistant program. As they worked on different English dialects — Australian, Singa-
porean and Indian English — he asked his boss: “What about African American Eng-
lish?” To this his boss responded: “Well, Apple products are for the premium mar-
ket.” (Benjamin 2019, 28) 
As a further example, she describes a Black computer scientist who chose a White voice for 
his app rather than a Black one, so as not to “create friction” (Benjamin 2019, 28–29). So while 
some designers might be unconsciously racialising their products as White, others are doing 
so in full awareness of this choice. 
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2.2.3  The Whiteness of Stock Images of AI  
As anyone working in the field will know, stock images of AI, at least when anthropomor-
phised, are overwhelmingly white and arguably overwhelmingly White. The more realisti-
cally humanoid these machines become, the more Caucasian in their features. Such images 
are not only used to illustrate generalist newspaper articles and corporate slideshows, but also 
specialist, technical works, and even works of a critical nature, such as Harry Collins’s Ar-
tifictional Intelligence (Polity, 2018) and Anthony Elliott’s The Culture of AI (Routledge, 
2018) (Figure 2). 
     
Fig. 2. Covers of Collins 2018, Polity, and Elliott 2018, Routledge. 
The prevalence of such images is reflected in the results of search engines. Such searches are 
a useful indicator of how a subject is portrayed at a given time, for two reasons. First, search 
engines are very widely used (approximately 3.5 billion searches are made on Google every 
day, or 40 thousand per second2), and can therefore be considered a highly influential source 
of information and perceptions. Second, the nature of such search engines means that they are 
not only promoting certain ideas and perceptions, but also reflecting their existing prevalence. 
While the exact nature of Google’s search, ranking, and results presentation algorithms is 
proprietary, we know that they evaluate (crudely put) influence and popularity -- for example, 
in terms of how many other sites link to a given website. So the fact that certain images are 
shown when someone searches for a relevant term means not only that those images are be-
ing thus promoted by some of the most powerful organs of content mediation in existence to-
day, but also that these images are already widespread and used on other influential websites, 
as that is what underlies their promotion by the search engines. 
Consequently, search results are increasingly examined by scholars, including in the study of 
racial bias. For example, in her 2018 book Algorithms of Oppression: How Search Engines 
Reinforce Racism, Safiya U. Noble identifies many ways in which such sites reflect and exac-
erbate prejudice, such as the search results for ‘Latinas’ that feature mostly porn (Noble 2018, 
 
2 https://www.internetlivestats.com/google-search-statistics/ accessed 30 December 2019. 
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75, 155) or the White men who come up when searching for images of professions such as 
‘construction worker’, ‘doctor’, or ‘scientist’ (Noble 2018, 82–83).  
In order to get an indication of the prevalence of these racialised machines on the internet we 
conducted two image searches on Google (the most widely used search engine) using the 
anonymous Tor browser to ensure results were not influenced by our personal search histo-
ries and locations. We first searched on the term ‘artificial intelligence’: the top results are in 
Figure 3. Some of these results are too abstract, featuring stylised brains and circuits for ex-
ample, to be considered racialised. However, among the results showing humanoid figures, 
racialisation as White predominates. First, two pictures show actual human hands, and both 
are White. Second, a further two pictures show humanoid robots, and both are white, and 
could thus be read as White, as Bartneck et al suggest (Bartneck et al. 2018, 202). Therefore we 
might say that inasmuch as the machines are racialised, they are racialised as White.  
 
 
Fig. 3. Tor browser Google image search result for ‘artificial intelligence’, 13 April 2020. 
In order to focus more on representations of embodied, anthropomorphic AI, we also 
searched for ‘artificial intelligence robot’: the top results are in Figure 4. As is clear, this 
search produces an even greater preponderance of images that are either white in colour or 
racialised as White or both. 
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Fig. 4. Tor browser Google image search result for ‘artificial intelligence robot’, 13 April 
2020. 
 
2.2.4  The Whiteness of AI in Film and Television  
These contemporary stock images distil the visualisations of intelligent machines in Western 
popular culture as it has developed over decades. In science fiction from the nineteenth cen-
tury onwards, AI is nearly always imagined as White. For example, the Terminator (Arnold 
Schwarzenegger), RoboCop (Peter Weller and Joel Kinnaman), all of the ‘replicants’ in the 
Blade Runner franchise (e.g. Rutger Hauer, Sean Young, and Mackenzie Davis), Sonny in I, 
Robot (Alan Tudyk), Ava in Ex Machina (Alicia Vikander), and Maria in Metropolis (Brig-
itte Helm) are all played by White actors and are visibly White on screen. Androids made of 
metal or plastic are also usually given White facial features, such as the robots in the 2007 
film I, Robot.  
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Fig. 5. Alicia Vikander as Ava in Ex Machina. Source: Youtube. 
Even disembodied AI is imagined as White: HAL-9000 in 2001: A Space Odyssey and Sa-
mantha in Her are voiced by White actors. All of these AIs come from Hollywood films; they 
have been produced in a country in which 18% of the population is Hispanic, but in which 
only one fictional robot has that background: Bender Rodríguez in the animated TV series 
Futurama, who is canonically constructed in Mexico – but who is voiced by the White voice 
actor John DiMaggio. Only very recent TV shows with a large cast of androids, such as West-
world and Humans, have attempted to address this with AI characters evincing a mix of skin 
tones and ethnicities. This preponderance of intelligent machines racialised as White led Dyer 
to posit “the android as a definition of whiteness” (Dyer 1997, 213).  
3. Understanding the Whiteness of AI 
We offer three interpretations of the racialisation of intelligent machines as White: the White-
ness of their creators perpetuating itself; the Whiteness of the attributes ascribed to AI; and 
the extent to which AI permits the erasure of people of colour from the White utopia.  
3.1 Whiteness Reproducing Whiteness 
In European and North American societies, Whiteness is normalised to an extent that renders 
it largely invisible. As Toby Ganley puts it in his survey of Whiteness studies, “the monopoly 
that whiteness has over the norm” is one of the field’s two unifying insights -- the other being 
that it confers power and privilege (Ganley 2003, 12). Richard Dyer describes this as the view 
that “other people are raced, we are just people” (Dyer 1997, 1). This normalisation means that 
Whiteness is not perceived by majority populations as a distinct colour, but rather as an ab-
sence of colour -- colour both in the literal sense and in the sense of race. Consequently, the 
Whiteness of AI could be considered simply a default. It does not appear as a feature, but is 
transparent, like the air we breathe: the “unmarked marker”, as Ruth Frankenberg calls it 
(Frankenberg 1997b, 1). The majority of White viewers are unlikely to see human-like ma-
chines as racialised at all, but simply as conforming to their idea of what ‘human-like’ means. 
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For non-White people, on the other hand, Whiteness is never invisible in this manner, as bell 
hooks reminds us (hooks [1992] 1997). So-called ‘colour-blindness’, an attitude of not seeing 
race, and of presuming that people in contemporary society are no longer disadvantaged on 
the basis of race, is itself a narrative that perpetuates White hegemony: “communities of color 
frequently see and name whiteness clearly and critically, in periods when white folks have as-
serted their own ‘color blindness’” (Frankenberg 1997b, 4). Noble argues that “central to these 
‘colorblind’ ideologies is a focus on the inappropriateness of ‘seeing race’” -- a view that she 
argues is dominant among Silicon Valley technologists, who “revel in their embrace of color-
blindness as if it is an asset and not a proven liability” (Noble 2018, 168). Such colour-blind-
ness is a liability because it obscures the normalisation of Whiteness and marginalisation of 
other racialised groups -- and the real world effects this has, such as facial recognition tech-
nologies not distinguishing Black or East Asian faces (Buolamwini and Gebru 2018).   
Given the normalisation of Whiteness, for some designers to make a human-like machine will 
unthinkingly mean to make a White machine. As Dyer puts it: “white people create the domi-
nant images of the world and don’t quite see that they thus create the dominant images of the 
world in their own image” (Dyer 1997, 9). But this is not a satisfactory explanation in its own 
right, as not all entities -- more specifically, not all intelligent, humanoid entities -- imagined 
by predominantly White industries are portrayed as White. For example, Western science fic-
tion has a long tradition of White authors racialising extraterrestrials as non-White. In the late 
nineteenth century, for instance, the real-world fear of the ‘Yellow Peril’ was metaphorically 
addressed in science fiction by racialising extraterrestrial invaders as East Asian. The Flash 
Gordon franchise gained its lead villain in a 1934 comic, which introduced the tyrannical em-
peror of the planet Mongo - the Orientalised alien Ming the Merciless. 
Such is the villain in Flash Gordon - a trident bearded, slanty eyed, shiny doomed 
[sic], pointy nailed, arching eyebrowed, exotically garbed Oriental named Ming, who 
personifies unadulterated evil. A heavy like Ming is not contrived in a comic strip 
writer’s imagination during a coffee break, but rather is the product of perhaps the 
richest and longest tradition of all of Hollywood ethnic stereotypes. (Barshay 1974, 24–
26) 
Dyer points out that Blade Runner similarly deliberately uses East Asian characters in order 
to offset the whiteness of its protagonists, including the White androids: “the yellow human 
background emphasises the chief protagonists’ whiteness. The whitest of hue are the repli-
cants” (Dyer 1997, 214). Racial stereotyping of aliens is not a phenomenon limited to past cen-
turies. The Star Wars prequel trilogy (Lucas 1999; 2002; 2005) has been criticised for the 
“transparent racism” in its depiction of the alien Jar Jar Binks as a West Indian caricature 
(Lavender 2011, 193) reminiscent of blackface minstrelsy (Williams 1999), and of the slave 
trader Watto, an antisemitic Jewish caricature with a large nose, skullcap, Yiddish accent, and 
obsession with money (Freedman 2019). 
This racialisation of aliens in SF suggests that the racialisation of artificial intelligence is a 
choice. The white racial frame as perpetuated by the White creators of these works portrays 
dangerous invaders from another planet as East Asian and bumbling alien petty-criminals as 
Afro-Caribbean. Therefore the fact that it portrays AI as overwhelmingly White requires fur-
ther explanation. In the following sections, we offer two. 
3.2  AI and the Attributes of Whiteness 
While Whiteness functions in part through its invisibility in mainstream discourse, this does 
not mean it has no distinguishable features of its own. Indeed, the white racial frame has a 
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long history of ascribing certain attributes to Whites and disputing them in others: these are 
the very claims that have been used to justify colonialism, segregation, and other modes of 
oppression. We argue that AI is predominantly racialised as White because it is deemed to 
possess attributes that this frame imputes to White people. We examine these attributes under 
three key headings: intelligence, professionalism, and power. 
First, the primary attribute being projected onto these machines is, as the term ‘AI’ suggests, 
intelligence. Throughout the history of Western thought, but in particular since the seven-
teenth century in Europe and the territories it colonised, intelligence has been associated with 
some humans more than others (Carson 2006). The idea that some races were more mentally 
able than others was crucial to the legitimation of the advancing colonial project. Those 
deemed less intelligent — in the words of Rudyard Kipling, “Half-devil and half-child” — 
were judged unqualified to rule themselves and their lands. It was therefore legitimate — 
even a duty, “the white man’s burden” as Kipling put it — to destroy their cultures and take 
their territories (Kipling 1899). Through the nineteenth century, strenuous efforts were made to 
empirically demonstrate and measure this intellectual difference, culminating in the develop-
ment of the IQ test (Gould 1981). Although explicit associations between racial groups and in-
telligence declined after the Second World War, (a) they continue to be made in right-wing 
circles (Saini 2019), and (b) implicit or unconscious associations between race and intelligence 
persist widely (see, for example, van den Bergh et al. 2010; Okeke et al. 2009). Given the white 
racial frame has for centuries promoted the association of intelligence with the White, Euro-
pean race, it is to be expected that when this culture is asked to imagine an intelligent ma-
chine it imagines a White machine. 
A crucial aspect of the idea of intelligence is generality. Intelligence is often defined as a 
“general mental capability” (Gottfredson 1997), and in AI, the concept of ‘artificial general in-
telligence’ -- a system with the kind of general, flexible mental capabilities humans have -- is 
often considered to be the original and primary goal of the field (Crevier 1993). But in the 
white racial frame, not all humans are considered to have this attribute to the same degree. As 
Weheliye puts it, using Sylvia Wynter’s idea of ‘the Man’ -- the Enlightenment, Western, 
White male subject, “In the context of the secular human, black subjects, along with indige-
nous populations, the colonised, the insane, the poor, the disabled, and so on serve as limit 
cases by which Man can demarcate himself as the universal human” (Weheliye 2014, 24). Ac-
cording to the white racial frame, it is the rational, scientific thought of the White Westerner 
that lays claim to universal validity -- or, we might say, true generality. Other races, by con-
trast, are framed as particular and subjective, constrained by the limits of their non-ideal bod-
ies and cultures to think thoughts that are partial and parochial. To imagine a truly intelligent 
machine, one with general intelligence, is therefore to imagine a White machine. 
Second, much of the current discourse around AI focuses on how it is, or will soon be, capa-
ble of professional work. This is frequently claimed to be what makes the present wave of au-
tomation different from previous waves, in which machines became capable of supplanting 
manual and semi-skilled labour (Ford 2015). Professional work -- law, medicine, business, and 
so forth -- is at the upper end of pay and status scales. White Europeans and North Americans 
have historically not considered all humans equally fit for such roles, and have kept them 
closed to people who lacked the requisite connections, wealth, or other in-group identifiers. 
Universities, the gateways to the professions, have long histories of excluding people of col-
our from their ranks (Burrow 2008, 107).  
The historic exclusion of anyone other than White men shapes to this day what mainstream 
White culture imagines when imagining someone fulfilling such roles. Safiya Noble shows 
that it took years of criticism before search engines adjusted their algorithms so that searching 
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for ‘engineer’ or ‘doctor’ stopped exclusively returning images of White men (Noble 2018). 
But the underlying bias, on which the algorithms fed, remains. To imagine a machine in a 
white-collar job is therefore to imagine a White machine.  
Third, hierarchies of intelligence and of professional status are of course also hierarchies of 
power. Consequently, power relations are implicit in the previous two categories. However, it 
is worth also considering power separately, because power-struggles between AI and humans 
are such a common narrative trope. Alongside the narrative that robots will make humans re-
dundant, an equally well-known narrative is that they will rise up and conquer us altogether 
(Cave and Dihal 2019). These are both narratives about machines becoming superior to hu-
mans: stories in which they become better at every task, leaving humans with nothing to do, 
from E.M. Forster’s 1909 short story ‘The Machine Stops’ to the Oscar-winning film WALL-
E, or in which they outwit and subjugate those who built them, as in the Terminator film 
franchise or the film Ex Machina (Forster 1909; Stanton 2008; Cameron 1984; Garland 2015). 
When White people imagine being overtaken by superior beings, those beings do not resem-
ble those races they have framed as inferior. It is unimaginable to a White audience that they 
will be surpassed by machines that are Black. Rather it is by superlatives of themselves: hy-
per-masculine White men like Arnold Schwarzenegger as the Terminator, or hyper-feminine 
White women like Alicia Vikander as Ava in Ex Machina. 
This is why even narratives of an AI uprising that are clearly modelled on stories of slave re-
bellions depict the rebelling AIs as White -- for example, in Blade Runner (Dihal 2020). The 
implication of this racialisation is that these machines might genuinely be superior, or are at 
least worthy adversaries. The use of White bodybuilders such as Arnold Schwarzenegger to 
play the evil robots suggests this. As Dyer points out, Schwarzenegger’s physique suggests 
“the body made possible by [...] natural mental superiority. The point after all is that it is 
built, a product of the application of thought and planning, an achievement” (Dyer 1997, 164). 
Consequently, for a White technologist or author, to imagine a superior anthropomorphic ma-
chine is to imagine a White machine.  
In summary, popular conceptions of AI suggest these machines have general intelligence, are 
capable of professional jobs, and/or are poised to surpass and supplant humanity. In the 
White imagination, such qualities are strongly associated with Whiteness. It is no surprise, 
therefore, that in mainstream Western media, such machines are portrayed as White. 
3.3  White Utopia 
While we believe the attribution to AI of these qualities, so strongly associated with White-
ness, goes a long way to making sense of the racialisation of anthropomorphic intelligent ma-
chines, we also want to one further hypothesis: that the Whiteness of the machines allows the 
White utopian imagination to fully exclude people of colour.  
One of the most pertinent hopes for artificial intelligence is that it will lead to a life of ease 
(Cave and Dihal 2019). As a tool that can take over ‘dirty, dull, or dangerous’ jobs, it relieves 
its owners from work they do not want to do, enabling them to pursue leisure. As critical race 
theorists have repeatedly pointed out, the leisure currently available to the wealthier classes is 
disproportionately facilitated by the labour of working-class women of colour (hooks [1992] 
1997; Rhee 2018). bell hooks shows that the people performing this labour are actively kept 
invisible, even when the White master and the coloured servant are physically present in the 
same space. She cites the memoirs of a White heiress who grew up with Black servants in her 
house: “Blacks, I realized, were simply invisible to most white people, except as a pair of 
hands offering a drink on a silver tray” (hooks [1992] 1997, 168). 
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As this forced pretence of invisibility shows, interactions with non-White servants are unde-
sirable to the White master: such interactions are almost literally considered a ‘dirty job’. De-
pictions of people of colour as being dirty and unwashed, eating dirty food, living in the dirt, 
even of being the colour of excrement, have contributed to the development of both the fear 
of pollution in interactions with people of colour, and the association of Whiteness with 
cleanliness and purity (Dyer 1997, 75–76). This association has been exacerbated by a long 
history of propaganda preceding conquest and genocide that portrays the racial other as evok-
ing disgust: as vectors of disease, such as lice or rats, or as a literal plague (Glover 1999, chap. 
35; Rector 2014, chap. 3). 
The utopia of the white racial frame would therefore rather remove people of colour alto-
gether, even in the form of servants. From the inception of the academic study of science fic-
tion onwards, many critics have pointed out that utopias throughout literary history have been 
construed on exclusionary, colonialist, and eugenicist premises (Suvin [1979] 2016, 179; Jame-
son 2005, 205; Ginway 2016, 132). In Astrofuturism, De Witt Douglas Kilgore shows that mid-
twentieth-century American visions of space age utopias are “idealisations ... based on a se-
ries of exclusions” (Kilgore 2010, 10): rather than depicting a post-racial or colourblind fu-
ture, the authors of these utopias simply omit people of colour.  
AI offers the possibility of making such racialised utopias real. By virtue of its generality, it 
is imagined as able to replace all and any unwanted labour -- social and cognitive as well as 
physical (Cave and Dihal 2019), so obviating the need for people of colour in any role. Con-
sequently, as Jennifer Rhee points out, advertisements for real AI such as household robots 
“are striking in their whiteness”: they are aimed at showing white middle-class families an 
ideal leisurely lifestyle. In doing so, she argues, “the images reserve the luxury of liberation 
from domestic labor for white women, while erasing the women of color who perform this 
labor, both within their own homes and in the homes of others” (Rhee 2018, 94).  
In some cases, the unsulliedness of this utopia can extend further to exclude all women. Just 
as people of colour can be associated with offensive physicality, so can women in general, 
particularly with respect to their reproductive organs. The necessity of sexual intercourse, 
pregnancy, and childbearing for the continuation of a race that prides itself on rationality and 
the ability to transcend its physicality is an offensive hurdle that has been imagined as 
transcendable by science for centuries. As Dyer points out, in the ideology of Whiteness, the 
elevation of mental over physical prowess has simultaneously been the White race’s most 
valuable achievement and a threat to its own continuation (Dyer 1997, 27). It has led to the 
paradox known as the ‘White Crisis’, in which the White race is seen as under threat of being 
overwhelmed by ‘inferior’ races that are breeding more prolifically. Transhumanism has been 
envisioned as a solution to this White Crisis (Ali 2017). Seen as a form of offspring, artificial 
intelligence offers a way for the White race to perpetuate its existence in a rationally optimal 
manner, improved through scientific and technological progress, without requiring sullied 
and suboptimal physical interactions. 
4. Conclusion and Implications 
Images of AI are not generic representations of human-like machines, but avatars of a partic-
ular rank within the hierarchy of the human. These representations of intelligent machines -- 
and our future with them -- are refracted through the white racial frame; their Whiteness a 
proxy for how we perceive their status and potential. This can cause what is sometimes called 
representational harms (Blodgett et al. 2020). We suggest three. 
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First, this racialisation can amplify the very prejudices it reflects. We have argued that intelli-
gent machines are portrayed as White because that is how the mainstream perceives intelli-
gence and related desirable characteristics. But equally, the consistent portrayal of intelligent 
machines as White itself transmits this association, so sustaining it. As we have argued else-
where (Whittlestone et al. 2019), bias in representations of AI contributes to a vicious cycle of 
social injustice: the biased representations can influence both aspiring technologists and those 
in charge of hiring new staff, shaping whom they consider fit for the field (Cave 2020). This 
could contribute to sustaining a racially homogenous workforce, which will continue to pro-
duce products, whether real intelligent machines or their representations, that are biased to 
benefit that group and disadvantage others.  
Second, the racialisation of these machines places them within an existing hierarchy of the 
human in a way that could exacerbate real injustice. Portrayals of AI as White situate these 
machines in a power hierarchy above currently marginalised groups, such as people of col-
our. These oppressed groups are therefore relegated to an even lower position in the hierar-
chy: below that of the machine. As machines become ever more important in making auto-
mated decisions -- frequently about marginalised groups (Eubanks 2017) -- this could be 
highly consequential. Automation bias -- the tendency of people to favor suggestions from 
automated decision-making systems over those from humans -- has already been evidenced 
(Goddard, Roudsari, and Wyatt 2012). We might speculate that it will be exacerbated in cases 
where such systems are racialised White and the humans in question are not. 
Third, these portrayals could distort our perceptions of the risks and benefits of these ma-
chines. For example, they could frame the debate about AI’s impact disproportionately 
around the opportunities and risks posed to White middle-class men (Cave 2020). It is already 
a common narrative that the current wave of automation differs from those of the past in that 
“impacts from automation have thus far impacted mostly blue-collar employment; the com-
ing wave of innovation threatens to upend white-collar work as well” (Pew Research Center 
2014). Public interest and policy therefore often focus on white collar professionals, instead of 
on marginalized groups, which in reality are likely to be worse affected by the impact of AI 
(Eubanks 2017; Noble 2018). 
In this paper, we have offered three interpretations of the whiteness and Whiteness of repre-
sentations of AI. All three, and the implications that we posit, need further investigation. This 
process is part of what can be described as decolonising AI: a process of breaking down the 
systems of oppression that arose with colonialism and have led to present injustices that AI 
threatens to perpetuate and exacerbate. Weheliye describes how he “works towards the aboli-
tion of Man, and advocates the radical reconstruction and decolonization of what it means to 
be human” (Weheliye 2014, 4). It is in the field of AI that technology is most clearly entwined 
with notions of ‘what it means to be human’, both in reality and in cultural fantasies. We 
hope to have taken a step towards this reconstruction, by drawing attention to the Whiteness 
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